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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Maurice Troutman was charged with a single count of rape after having had sex
with a woman at the Grove Hotel in Boise. The State's theory was that the alleged
victim was either unconscious at the time, or unable to resist, due to her ingestion of
alcohol and a prescription sleeping aid, Ambien. The alleged victim had very little
recollection of the sex with Mr. Troutman.
Mr. Troutman's defense was that the sex was purely consensual, the alleged
victim was an active participant, and the fact that the alleged victim simply did not
remember it did not make it rape. In support of this defense, he presented evidence
that one of the side effects of Ambien is that people using it can appear wide awake and
fully functional at times during the night, but have no recollection of the previous night's
activities the following morning. This phenomenon is known as intro grade amnesia.
Ultimately, however, a jury found Mr. Troutman guilty and the district court
imposed a sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed.
Mr. Troutman now appeals.

On appeal, he contends that, throughout her

opening, closing, and rebuttal arguments, the prosecutor in his case engaged in
numerous acts of misconduct which, whether considered individually, or in the
aggregate, constitute fundamental error entitling Mr. Troutman to a new trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Maurice Troutman attended the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff on a football
scholarship. (

1 p..)

He graduated magna cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts

degree in 2005 (PSI, p . l l ) , then went on to follow his dream of playing professional

football (see PSI, p.12). After playing for a number of different teams, Mr. Troutman
eventually signed with the Bakersfield (California) Blitz, an arena football team, in the
spring of 2007. (PSI, p.12.) He earned a role as a starting defensive end for the Blitz,
and was both "a great player" and a team leader. (Tr., p.246, Ls.2-3, p.246, L.25

-

p.247, L.3.)
In July of 2007, the Blitz came to Boise to play a game against the Boise Bum.
(Tr., p.249, Ls.15-18.) The team arrived in Boise on Friday, July 6, 2007, played their
game against the Burn on Saturday night, and had planned to head home late Sunday
afternoon. (Tr., p.285, L.11 - p.286, L.24.) They were staying at the Grove Hotel in
downtown Boise. (Tr., p.249, Ls.19-20; p.286, L.25 - p.287, L.2.)
Following the game on Saturday night, many of the Blitz players and coaches
went out to enjoy the Boise nightlife. (See, e.g., Tr., p.213, Ls.5-14 (Leo Sullivan, a Blitz
player, testifying that ''we all went out drinking," referring to himself and a number of
other players), p.250, L.20 - p.252, L.l (Eric Coleman, a Blitz coach, testifying that he
and his fellow coaches also went out drinking).) Obviously, the end result of such nights
out on the town is that the players oftentimes have romantic encounters with women
they had not previously known. (See Tr., p.235, L.17 - p.236, L.l; see also Tr., p.711,
Ls.5-15 (district court noting that professional athletes will often have attractive women
"throwing themselves at them," and recognizing that there might be "groupies" or sports
fans who would be eager for sex with a professional football player such as
Mr. Troutman).) Indeed, as one Blitz player explained it (and as common sense bears
out), this is simply what happens when young men, and even young women, go out
looking for a good time. (See Tr., p.235, L.20 - p.236, L.I.) As the district court noted

though, professional football players are probably more likely to be successful than
others in finding willing partners for casual sex. (See Tr., p.709, Ls.7-8, p.711, Ls.5-15.)
And, indeed, this seems to have been the case for the Blitz players when they came to
Boise since, although not a central issue to this case, the record nevertheless reflects
that a number of Blitz players found companionship after the game. (See, e.g., Tr.,
p.172, Ls.1-17 (Yessenia Relano testifying that she walked into a hotel room, only to
find a number of Blitz players, one of whom was having sexual intercourse with an
unidentified woman),' p.178, L.25

- p.179, L.13 (Ms.

Relano testifying that she spent

the night with another of the Blitz players); p.233, Ls.2-9 (Leo Sullivan, one of the Blitz
players, testifying that he met a girl at a bar and brought her back to his hotel room).)
Mr. Troutman is one of the Blitz players who had sex with a previously unknownpartner that night. According to Mr. Troutman, he knocked on the door of the hotel
room of one of his teammates (the same room where Ms. Relano observed one of the
Blitz players engaging in sexual intercourse with an unidentified woman) and
Ms. Relano, and the player whom she would eventually end up spending the night with,
answered the door. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Troutman reports that he spoke to Ms. Relano,
inquiring whether she had any female friends who might be interested in partying with
the team, to which Ms. Relano allegedly handed Mr. Troutman the key card to her room
and suggested he go meet her roommate, Heather Schillereff, in the hotel room they
were sharing.' (Tr., p.455, Ls.1-23.) According to Mr. Troutman, he eventually went to

' Ms. Relano did not specifically identify the male participant as a Blitz player; however,

in describing the same scenario, Mr. Troutman did specifically indicate that it was one of
his teammates "having sex with a woman he met earlier in the night." (PSI, p.4.)
Although Ms. Relano's memory of the night in question is suspect given her level of
intoxication (see Tr., p.191, Ls.2-18, p.192, Ls.11-21), she claims that she specifically
3

the room, went inside, and met Ms. Schillereff. (PSI, p.4.) He says that Ms. Schillereff
appeared to make an advance toward him, he then initiated physical contact, she
responded in a positive manner, and, ultimately, they ended up having sex. (PSI, pp.45.) According to Mr. Troutman, Ms. Schillereff was a very active participant in the sex,
removing her own pants, attempting to take Mr. Troutman's pants off, and repeatedly
changing positions. (PSI, p.5; State's Exhibit 22A, p.12, Ls.8-16, p.19, Ls.1-4 (transcript
of police interrogation of Mr. Troutman).) After sex, Mr. Troutman left.3 (PSI, p.5.)
Apparently, Mr. Troutman assumed that Ms. Schillereff was simply one of the many
female fans who was interested in nothing more than having sex with one or more of the
players. (See Tr., p.456, L.21 - p.457, L.2.)
Unbeknownst to Mr. Troutman, however, not only had Ms. Schillereff been
drinking prior to her encounter with him, but she had also taken a sleeping pill, Ambien.
(Tr., p.78, Ls.16-21, p.128, L.15 - p.130, L.13.) One of the side effects of Ambien is
intro grade amnesia-the

appearance of having been fully awake and functional while

under the effects of the drug, but having no memory of the actions engaged in. (Tr.,
~.575,L.6-~.576,L.5,~.583,L.12-~.584,L.I2.)

remembers intentionally leaving her key card behind in her room (Tr., p.174, Ls.8-22.).
Even if one is to believe that Ms. Relano thought it was a good idea to intentionally lock
herself out of her own hotel room, and that she truly had a specific memory (months
later) of doing so even though she could not remember (the next morning) certain other
far less mundane details of the night (such as posing for a picture with the man she
would end up sleeping with that night), one would also have to assume that the player
who would end up sleeping with Ms. Relano that night then somehow stole the key card
after Ms. Relano put it down, and then passed it to Mr. Troutman later in the evening.
Although this version of events can certainly relieve Ms. Relano of any feelings of guilt
for later events, Mr. Troutman submits that this is a highly unlikely scenario.
Mr. Troutman submits that he put the keycard down and his teammate, Rennard
Reynolds took it. (PSI, p.5.)

In the morning, when Ms. Schillereff awoke, she had only a vague sense that she
had had sex the night before. (Tr., p.83, Ls.13-19.) Even as she tried to remember the
details of the night, she could only come up with fleeting snapshots of the previous
night's sexual encounter. (Tr., p.83, L.20 - p.84, L.lO.) Understandably, she was quite
confused (Tr., p.85, Ls.21-23), but, eventually, the police were contacted and informed
of the possible sexual assault (Tr., p.325, Ls.16-19, pp.17-23).
Ultimately, Mr. Troutman voluntarily revealed that he had had sex with
Ms. Schillereff the previous night; however, he insisted that it was purely consensual.
(Tr., p.453, L.1

- p.457,

L.2.) Based upon Mr. Troutman's admission that there had

been sex though, he was arrested and charged with rape. The Indictment charges that
the sex constituted rape because either: (a) it was with someone who was unable to
resist due to an intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic substance (I.C. § 18-6101(4)); or
(b) it was with someone who was unconscious of the nature of the act (I.C. § 186101(5). (R., pp.11-13.)
Mr. Troutman exercised his right to a jury trial. (See generally Tr., p.17, L.?

-

p.675, L.12; Supp. Tr.) At trial, the State's theory was that Mr. Troutman had knowingly
taken advantage of a heavily-sedated victim. (See Tr., p.33, L.7

- p.53,

L.8 (State's

opening statement), p.624, L.12 - p.657, L.13 (State's closing argument), p.665, L.2 p.671, L.4 (State's rebuttal argument).) The defense theory was that the sex had been
purely consensual, but that Ms. Schillereff simply did not remember that it was
consensual. (See Tr., p.53, L.13 - p.58, L.2 (defense's opening statement), p.657, L.16

- p.664, L.25 (defenses closing argument).)

In the end, the jury adopted the State's

theory, finding Mr. Troutman guilty of rape. (R., p.64; Tr., p.672, L.4 - p.674, L.4.)

Mr. Troutman now appeals.

On appeal, he contends that the prosecutor

engaged in numerous acts of misconduct which denied him due process of law and a
fair trial, and he requests a new trial.

ISSUE
Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct depriving Mr. Troutman of due process of law
and a fair trial, such that he is now entitled to a new trial?

I.
The Prosecutor's Misconduct Warrants A New Trial
A.

Introduction
Mr. Troutman contends that his right to a fair trial4 and his right to due process of

law5 were both abridged through the prosecutor's numerous instances of misconduct
during her opening statements and closing arguments in this case. He further contends
that these many instances of prosecutorial misconduct, whether considered
independently, or in the aggregate, are so egregious as to constituted fundamental,
reversible error.
B.

Standard Of Review
Because Mr. Troutman's prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in

constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises
free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho I,2, I37 P.3d 388, 389 (2006).
C.

The Prosecutor Enaaaed In Numerous Acts Of Misconduct
1.

The Prosecutor Enaaaed In Misconduct By Askina The Jurv To Draw
Inferences Which She Knew To Be False And Were Whollv Inconsistent
With The State's Theorv In Another Case. And Bv Doing So For The
Purpose Of Preiudicing The Jurv Aaainst Mr. Troutman

During trial, the State introduced evidence that the computerized lock on the door
of Ms. Schillereffs hotel room had been opened four times between 3:00 a.m. and dawn
with the key card that had been given to Mr. Troutman. (See Tr., p.416, L.9

- p.430,

L.23; State's Exhibit 28.) Under the State's theory of the case, all four of these entries
4

See U.S. CONST.amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO
CONST.,art. I § 13.
See U.S. CONST.amend. XIV; IDAHO
CONST.,art. I § 13.

were unauthorized. However, the evidence adduced at trial indicated that Mr. Troutman
entered the room only once.

(See, e.g., Tr., p.452, L.14 - p.456, L.2 (Detective

Brechwald testifying that Mr. Troutman admitted entering Ms. Schillereff's hotel room
once and having sex with her).) More importantly, the State knew that Mr. Troutman
had entered the hotel room only once because the prosecutor knew that Mr. Reynolds
(the teammate who ended up with the key card after Mr. Troutman had sex with
Ms. Schillereff) had admitted that, after obtaining the key card from Mr. Troutman, he
had entered Ms. Schillereff's hotel room three separate times and, while in the room the
first time had taken an iPod and the battery charger for that iPod and, while in the
second time, had specifically gone looking for additional items to steal and may have
actually taken some other items. (See Grand Jury Tr., p.161, L.12 - p.173, L.17.) In
fact, these admissions by Mr. Reynolds were the key pieces of evidence in the
indictment of Mr. Reynolds for two counts of burg~ary.~
(See Grand Jury Tr., p.197,
Ls.3-16; R., pp.12-13.)
Although she knew that Mr. Troutman had entered Ms. Schillereff's room only
once in the early morning hours of July 8, 2007, and that the three subsequent entries
(as well as the theft of an iPod and its battery charger) were perpetrated by

Although the disposition of the case against Mr. Reynolds does not appear in the
record in this case, it appears that Mr. Reynolds ultimately pled guilty, received
concurrent five year sentences, served a rider, and has since been placed on probation.
Website
(See
Idaho
Supreme
Court
Data
Repository
(https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=ADA&count
y=Ada&partySeq=432164&displayName=ReynoIds%2C+Rennard+A)(last visited Nov.
6,2008).)
The same prosecutor, Fafa Alidjani, handled the grand jury proceedings where
both Mr. Troutman and Mr. Reynolds were indicted (see generally Grand Jury Tr.), and
Mr. Troutman's trial (see generally Tr.). The record does not disclose whether
Ms. Alidjani continued to be the lead prosecutor on Mr. Reynolds' case.

Mr. Reynolds, the prosecutor nevertheless argued as follows during her closing
argument:
At 4:53 a.m. we know that room has been entered a second time. I
don't have to prove if there was a rape or theft there, because the victim is
unconscious. She is unaware these multiple entries are happening. She
doesn't know who is coming into the room, to tell us again at 5:09 a.m., 16
minutes later, the room is entered again.
The same key card the defendant had in his possession. That key
card never went back to [Ms. Relano] and was never placed back into the
room, so he had it, and he says he handed off to a third party unknown to
the victim. Okay?
So either he [Mr. Troutmanl or someone that he desianated, by
passing it alona, is going into that room aaain. And that happens, a
second entrv happens. Again, don't know if there is rape or theft
happening aqain.
[The key card] again is used one hour later. There is a fourth entrv.
again, do not know what other crimes were committed aaainst this woman
durina that time frame. We do know at some point the iPod was taken
from the room. Her other luagaqe was searched. The wires that ao with it
are taken out of the room as well, and aaain, I don't know-that's a side
issue. I don't know if Mr. Troutman did that bevond a reasonable doubt or
if his buddv that he passed the card to did that, but I do know that
Mr. Troutman returned it all to the front desk when he knew the police was
[sic] on them, and he would be getting caught.
And their repetitive entering into the room obviously speaks
squarely to the point of her ability to be able to appreciate the nature of the
act, which is penetration in this case.
(Tr., p.642, L.5

- p.643, L.20 (emphasis added).)

Thus, the prosecutor implied that:

(a) Mr. Troutman must have known that Ms. Schillereff was incapacitated because he
may have snuck back into her hotel room one or more times after having sex with her;
and (b) Mr. Troutman is simply a bad man, a criminal, who may have raped and stolen
from Ms. Schillereff multiple times. However, these implications by the prosecutor were
extremely dishonest since she knew very well that Mr. Reynolds had entered
Ms. Schillereffs room three separate times; she knew that Mr. Troutman certainly could

not have raped Ms. Schillereff multiple times; and she knew that Mr. Reynolds was the
one who had taken the iPod and its charger, and had rooted around for additional items
to steal.
Mr. Troutman contends that the above-quoted portion of the prosecutor's closing
statement constituted misconduct for at least three reasons. First, she sought to have
the jury draw inferences which she knew to be false. Second, these false inferences
were plainly inconsistent with the theory taken by the State in its prosecution of
Mr. Reynolds. Third, these false inferences were encouraged in an effort to prejudice
the jury against Mr. Troutman.
a)

The Prosecutor Enaaaed In Misconduct When She Sought To
Have The Jurv Draw Inferences Which She Knew To Be False

When she stated that Mr. Troutman may have re-entered Ms. Schillereff's room
after having sex with her, may have sexually assaulted her again, and may have taken
Ms. Schillereff's iPod, the prosecutor clearly sought to have the jury infer that
Mr. Troutman had, in fact, done those things.

However, when she made those

statements, knowing what inferences would naturally be drawn by the jurors, she did so
with full knowledge that evidence the jury had not heard proved those inferences
absolutely false. This constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.
It is now well-established that a prosecutor may not misstate the evidence that
has been presented to the jury. See, e.g., State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 181 P.3d
496, 500-01 (Ct. App. 2007) ("It is plainly improper for a party to present closing
argument that misrepresents or mischaracterizes the evidence."). The reason for this
ought to be quite obvious:

A prosecutinq attorney is a public officer, "acting in a quasi iudicial
capacity." It is his duty to use all fair, honorable, reasonable, and lawful
means to secure the conviction of the guilty who are or may be indicted in
the courts of his judicial circuit. He should see that they have a fair and
impartial trial, and avoid convictions contrary to law. Nothing should tempt
him to appeal to prejudicies, to pervert the testimony, or make statements
to the jury, which, whether true or not, have not been proved. The desire
for success should never induce him to endeavor to obtain a verdict by
arguments based on anything except the evidence in the case, and the
conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the same . . .

. . . Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the
machinew of the court, and that they occupv an official position, which
necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their statements, action,
and conduct in the course of trial and in the presence of the jury that they
will give to counsel for the accused. It seems that they frequently exert
their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of
error, and generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights of the
accused. It is the dutv of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair
trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the iuw. and
above all thinas he should guard against anvthina that would preiudice the
minds of the jurors, and tend to hinder them from considerina only the
evidence introduced.
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608, 609-11 (1903) (emphasis added).

If it is unfair and, indeed, improper for a prosecutor to mislead the jury about the
evidence that it has already heard, then surely it is also unfair and improper for the
prosecutor to mislead the jury about the evidence that it has not had the benefit of
hearing for itself. In the former instance, at least the jurors have an opportunity to
compare their own recollections of the evidence against the arguments presented by
the prosecutor, and there is the potential for them to disregard the prosecutor's
misstatements and find the truth. However, the latter instance is far more insidious, as
the jurors have no opportunity to sift through the prosecutor's misstatements and find
the truth.

In this case, because the prosecutor misled the jury by asking them to draw an
inference about Mr. Troutman which she knew to be false, she denied Mr. Troutman
due process of law and a fair trial.
b)

The Prosecutor Enaaged In Misconduct When She Presented The
Jury With A Theory That Was Whollv Inconsistent With The
Evidence And Theon, That Was Then Beinq Pursued Aqainst
Mr. Revnolds

Just as it is the duty of the prosecutor to avoid the presentation of false evidence,
or misstating the evidence presented, it is also her obligation to refrain from offering
inconsistent theories of how a crime was committed. See Nguyen v. Lindsey, 232 F.3d
1236, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000); Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997)
(en banc), vacated on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998); Sfate v. Pearce, 146 ldaho
241, 248-49, 192 P.3d 1065, 1072-73 (2008). Both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
and the ldaho Supreme Court have recognized that, unless there is new or different
evidence in the two criminal cases, it is misconduct for the prosecutor to argue
inconsistent theories regarding those facts in two different cases involving two different
defendants. See Nguyen, 232 F.3d at 1240; Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1058; Pearce, 146
ldaho at 248-49, 192 P.3d at 1072-73.
In this case, the State's theory at Mr. Troutman's trial-that
repeatedly entered Ms. Schillereff's room to victimize her-was

Mr. Troutman had

plainly inconsistent with

the theory it presented to the grand jury in seeking to obtain an indictment against
Mr. Reynolds. (Compare Tr., p.642, L.5 - p.643, L.20 (prosecutor's closing argument at
Mr. Troutman's trial implying that Mr. Troutman had repeatedly entered Ms. Schillereff's
room, had repeatedly sexually assaulted her, and had stolen her iPod), with Grand Jury
Tr., p.161, L.12 - p.173, L.17 (State's evidence, presented at grand jury proceedings,

indicating that Mr. Reynolds had been the one to repeatedly enter Ms. Schillereff's hotel
room, not Mr. Troutman).) Under cases such as Nguyen, Thompson, and Pearce, this
tactic was plainly improper and worked to deny Mr. Troutman his rights to a fair trial and
due process of law.
c)

The Prosecutor Enqaged in Misconduct When, For The Pur~oseOf
lnflaminq The Passions And Preiudices Of The Jurv, She Souaht
To Have The Jurv Infer That Mr. Troutman Had Committed Other
Uncharqed Crimes

Perhaps even more troubling than the fact that the prosecutor knowingly misled
the jury by implying that Mr. Troutman had re-entered Ms. Schillereff's hotel room,
repeatedly assaulted her, and took her iPod, is the fact that the only reason for her to
have done so was to obtain a conviction by prejudicing the jury against Mr. Troutman.
Cf I.R.E. 404(b) (implicitly recognizing that evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts"

is generally not probative of whether the defendant is guilty of the charged offense, and
that there is a danger that a jury could nevertheless convict a defendant on the basis of
such other crimes, wrongs, or acts).) This is improper as well. Cf Sfate v. Porter, 130
Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997) (holding that prosecutorial actions aimed at
inflaming the passions and prejudices of the jury against the defendant not only
constitute prosecutorial misconduct, but that they rise to the level of fundamental error).
Thus, even if it was not improper for the prosecutor to attempt to mislead the jury, doing
so for the purpose of prejudicing the jury against Mr. Troutman violated his rights to a
fair trial and due process of law.

2.

The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Distortinq Mr. Troutman's
Defense, Asking The Jurors To Convict Mr. Troutman In An Effort To Cure
Societal Problems And Out Of Fear For Their Own Safety (Or The Safety
Of Others), And By Seeking To Reduce The State's Burden Of Proof

In his own closing argument, defense counsel argued extensively that, given
Mr. Troutman's repeated statements that the sex with Ms. Schillereff had been purely
consensual, Ms. Schillereff's inability to recall events (even things that we know she had
done while fully conscious) and her confusion over whether she had had consensual
sex on the night in question, and the defense's expert's testimony regarding the
possibility of Ms. Schillereff having suffered intro grade amnesia as a consequence of
her taking Ambien, the jury was faced with at least a reasonable doubt as to
Mr. Troutman's guilt and should acquit him.

(Tr., p.657, L.16 - p.684, L.25.) On

rebuttal, the prosecutor opened her argument as follows:
[H]e would have a done deal if, based on this argument, we are all going
to have to put heavy locks on our doors, on the windows in our house and
wear chastity belts when we go to bed, because in case you are lawfully
ingesting any substance that makes you unable to fend for yourself and
the next day you can't remember much about what's happened, but the
law enforcement has done their absolute best and has figured out the
criminal involved and the crime that's committed, you are at fault, and
there is no crime.
Under this suggestion, if your house door is unlocked and a person
walking by decides that they are going to check all the doors in the
neighborhood in the middle of the night and see who's got something they
can take, comes into your house, and you happen to have taken a
sleeping pill, or whatever, or are just a really heavy sleeper and someone
comes through your house, take everything you have and goes, "Hey,
buddy, I'm taking your car," and you don't wake up, and he leaves.
When he is caught later, he is going to go, "I was in his house. It
was unlocked. He didn't tell me Icouldn't come in."
And then I said to him, "Dude, I'm taking your car, and he doesn't
remember, and he did not follow the warnings on the Ambien he was
taking that said don't mix it with alcohol, that's his fault."

When you start shifting the blame in a case like this onto the victim
for her inability to remember every detail of what she was doing behind
her locked door, in her own bedroom, in her own bed, then you are turning
the world upside down. Justice not in its real sense, but what conceptual
sense is.
(Tr., p.665, L.2 - p.666, L.15.) A short while later, she continued in a similar vein,
arguing as follows: "People who are victimized, you cannot blame them later that they
may have a mental illness, maybe they have Alzheimer's. This means that those folks
are open target. They might not know what happens to them, because they can't
remember tomorrow what happened." (Tr., p.670, Ls.5-10.)
Mr. Troutman contends that these arguments are improper for a host of reasons:
they grossly misstated and distorted what Mr. Troutman's defense actually was; they
exhorted the jurors to convict Mr. Troutman based on a desire to cure a greater societal
problem andlor protect themselves and others; and seek to reduce the State's burden of
proof.
a)

The Prosecutor Enaaqed In Misconduct Bv Misre~resentinaAnd
Distortina Mr. Troutman's Defense

In the portion of her rebuttal argument quoted above, the prosecutor
characterized Mr. Troutman's defense as being one of "I didn't hear her say 'no,' so I
took that as a 'yes."'

She argued extensively about how, "[ulnder this [defense]

suggestion," every criminal would have a free pass to victimize unconscious people or
those with mental deficits. (See Tr., p.665, L.15 - p.666, L.8.) However, this is a gross
mischaracterization of the defense. Clearly, the defense was not simply that, because
she was unconscious, Ms. Schillereff failed to say "no"; the defense was that she was a
fully conscious, active participant in sex with Mr. Troutman. (See, e.g., Tr., p.55, Ls.6-9
("[Ulnder the influence of alcohol and this sedative, she could be so out of it that she

could engage in consensual sexual activity and not even be aware of it."), p.664, Ls.712 ("Is it possible that she could have functioned in a sexual way with Maurice Troutman
and have no memory of it? Of course, it's possible. Based on the evidence that you
have seen, it is possible, and that is reasonable doubt.").) Such an attempt by the
prosecutor to distort and disparage the defense, however, is plainly improper. Stafe v.
Beebe, 145 ldaho 570, 576, 181 P.3d 496, 502 (Ct. App. 2007). Accordingly, it denied

Mr. Troutman his rights to due process and a fair trial.
In addition, the prosecutor repeatedly characterized the defense as "blaming"
Ms. Schillereff for the alleged crime.

However, the defense never once "blamed"

Ms. Schillereff for anything; it merely pointed out that her lack of memory of the events
in question amounted to a lack of proof on the State's part and was sufficient to create a
reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecutor again improperly distorted and disparaged the
defense. See Beebe, 145 ldaho at 576, 181 P.3d at 502.
Both of the foregoing mischaracterizations of the defense were obviously
calculated to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury. With regard to the former
mischaracterization (about silence constituting consent), as is discussed in the following
subsection, the prosecutor obviously intended to make the jurors fearful that, if they did
not convict Mr. Troutman and send a message in this case, they would be opening the
door to the victimization of unconscious or mentally deficient people everywhere. With
regard to the latter mischaracterization (about blaming the victim), the prosecutor clearly

sought to engender sympathy for the victim (which, as is discussed in later sections,
was, unfortunately, a tactic which permeated this case).7
b)

The Prosecutor Endaged In Misconduct By Exhortinq The Jurors
To Convict Mr. Troutman Based On A Desire To Cure A Greater
Societal Problem And/or Protect Themselves And Others

Throughout the above-quoted portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, she
implored the jury to imagine a world where the defense argument is accepted and
Mr. Troutman is acquitted, and she portrayed that world as one where it is not safe to
close your eyes at night unless you have "heavy locks" and "chastity belts" to keep you
safe, and where criminals will be free to victimize the sleeping and the mentally deficient
with impunity. (See Tr., p.665, L.2 - p.666, L.15, p.670, Ls.5-10.) Thus, she asked the
jury to convict Mr. Troutman to alleviate societal problems that are much larger than
Mr. Troutman's own case, and out of fear for themselves, their families, and, in fact,

' The prosecutor's disingenuous claim that the defendant is "blaming the victim" is

particularly insidious in a rape case. One of the traditional dangers in any rape case
has been that the defendant would seek to portray the alleged victim as a "slut,"
"whore," or "loose" woman, in the hope that the jury would assume that if she frequently
consented to sex, she must have consented to sex on the occasion in question, or
somehow deserved to be raped even if she did not consent. Obviously, such evidence
is wholly irrelevant to the incident at issue, and highly prejudicial to the State's case. To
combat the danger of such victim-blaming, the ldaho Supreme Court promulgated ldaho
Rule of Evidence 412, which provides that evidence of the past sexual behavior of the
alleged victim is generally not admissible. See I.R.E. 412.
Times have changed, of course, and the gender-based double-standard
attendant to sexual experience has certainly diminished, so one would hope that jurors
now recognize that a woman does not necessarily consent to all sex under all
circumstances, just because she my have had prior sexual experiences. Indeed, most
modern jurors would probably bristle at a defendant's attempt to portray the sex as
consensual just because the victim is a "slut." Thus, in this case, by mischaracterizing
the defense as one of shifting blame to the alleged rape victim, the prosecutor tapped
into any outrage the jurors might have had over the traditional, deeply offensive,
gender-based double-standard attendant to sexual experience.

anyone else who might become a victim of a home invasion. As the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals has held, this is improper:
A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal
defendant in order to protect community values, preserve
civil order, or deter future law-breaking. The evil lurking in
such prosecutorial appeals is that the defendant will be
convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or
innocence. Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to
believe that, by convicting a defendant, they will assist in the
solution of some pressing social problem. The amelioration
of society's woes is far too heavy a burden for the individual
criminal defendant to bear.

. . . Weatherspoon's guilt at trial depended entirely on proof that he was in
possession of a gun at the time that the car was pulled over. Those
prosecutorial urgings--especially the later ones encouraging a conviction
to protect other individuals in the community-spoke not to that question,
but rather to the potential social ramifications of the jury's reaching a guilty
verdict. They were clearly designed to encourage the jury to enter a
verdict on the basis of emotion rather than fact. As such, they were
irrelevant and improper.
United Sfates v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United
States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted); accord Sfafe v.
Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 367, 972 P.2d 737, 745 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an
argument that the defendant was a "[dlrug dealer to your sons and daughters" was an
improper appeal to the jurors' fears). Accordingly, the prosecutor's appeal in this regard
abridged Mr. Troutman's rights to due process and a fair trial.
c)

The Prosecutor Enqaged In Misconduct Bv Seekinq To Reduce
The State's Burden Of Proof

The above-quoted portion of the prosecutor's closing argument not only distorted
Mr. Troutman's defense and appealed to the jury to convict Mr. Troutman as part of
some larger crime-fighting crusade, but it also subtly sought to relax the State's burden
of proof. She did so by arguing that, just because the State's key witness could not

testify as to whether a crime had committed and, if so, by whom, the jury should
nevertheless convict Mr. Troutman because "the law enforcement has done their
absolute best and has figured out the criminal involved and the crime that's
committed . . .."

(Tr., p.665, Ls.3-14.)

In essence, the prosecutor argued for a

presumption of guilt, based on the mere fact that Mr. Troutman was believed to be guilty
by the police (see Tr., p.665, Ls.3-14), instead of the presumption of innocence that is
mandated by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Taylor v.

Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, (1895).
This is misconduct which is so egregious that it rises to the level of fundamental error.
Stafe v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993).
3.

The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Attemoting To Generate
Svmpathv For Ms. Schillereff And/or Derision For Mr. Troutman

As noted above, the prosecutor's arguments in this case were replete with
attempts to engender sympathy for Ms. Schillereff. In addition to mischaracterizing the
defense as "blaming the victim," and thereby engendering sympathy for Ms. Schillereff
that way (see Part ll(C)(2)(a), supra), the prosecutor made a number of much more
overt pleas for pity for the alleged victim. In her opening statement, the prosecutor,
instead of simply discussing the procedures used and results obtained through
Ms. Schillereffs "sexual assault examination," chose to highlight Ms. Schillereffs
suffering during the rape exam, describing her "going through the rape kit and the rape
exam and sufferina from five hours of that on her own without really knowing what all is
going on and not having an answer to anything."

(Tr., p.48, Ls.20-24 (emphasis

added).) Later, in her closing argument, the prosecutor attempted again to generate
sympathy for Ms. Schillereff when she argued as follows:

We have been talking about, of course, a human being, not just some
random person that you meet. You know, we talked about it at the time of
the jury selection. This is not somebody we hear about in a newspaper, or
in the media. This is a real person who was here in the state of
ldaho. . . . She came here to have a very nice time and, of course, ended
up having a very, very traumatic situation happen to her.
(Tr., p.630, Ls.4-14.) Finally, in her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor could not just
identify Ms. Schillereff by name (or even by the loaded term "victim" which had been
used throughout this case); she had to refer to her as "[tlhe poor woman . . . ." (Tr.,
p.668, Ls.8-10.)
All of the foregoing statements, as well as the prosecutor's mischaracterization of
Mr. Troutman's defense, plainly appear to have been part of an ongoing effort to induce
the jury to convict Mr. Troutman out of sympathy for Ms. Schillereff's plight. This is
improper under the facts of any case. Beebe, 145 ldaho at 571-72, 181 P.3d at 501-02;
cf State v. Peite, 122 ldaho 809, 819, 839 P.2d 1223, 1233 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting that
it is improper for a prosecutor to ask a question of an alleged victim in order to generate
sympathy for that person). However, it is particularly problematic here, where even if
Mr. Troutman is innocent, one cannot help but feel a great deal of sympathy for
Ms. Schillereff based on how scary it is to think that one could take an Ambien, engage
in potentially uncharacteristic and risky (but consensual) sexual behavior, and have
practically no memory of it the next day.
in addition to trying to generate sympathy for Ms. Schillereff, the prosecutor also
sought to generate resentment toward Mr. Troutman.

Not only did she do so by

implicitly asking the jury to (incorrectly) infer that Mr. Troutman had repeatedly entered
Ms. Schillereff's room, repeatedly sexually assaulted her, and took her iPod (see Part
I(C)(l)(c), supra), but she also repeatedly highlighted her contention that Mr. Troutman

is thoughtless, uncaring, and inconsiderate because, when he had sex with
Ms. Schillereff, he did not use a condom. In her opening statement, she argued as
follows: "Ladies and gentleman, you will learn that he didn't even bother wearina a
condom, and, that is, the sexual assault examination did later testing at the lab, did yield
to results that showed that his semen was on her vaginal area . . . ." (Tr., p.52, Ls.6-10
(emphasis added).) Although that argument was not as egregious as it perhaps could
have been because the irrelevant implication that Mr. Troutman is a bad man for not
wearing a condom was woven into a relevant discussion of the reason why DNA
evidence was found in this case, it was made that much more egregious when it was
repeated and eventually expanded upon during the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal
arguments. In her closing argument, the prosecutor again denigrated Mr. Troutman for
not wearing a condom: "His DNA is left behind, because he did not wear a condom. &
did not care enouqh to protect who he is qoina to have sex with." (Tr., p.650, Ls.4-6
(emphasis added).) Later, she expanded upon her previous judgment of Mr. Troutman
by engaging in an irrelevant, but emotional, discussion of the risks of unprotected sex:
"The only semen on this woman is from that guy. She has to take protective measures
later to make sure she doesn't get preanant by him or she doesn't aet all the thincls that
come a1on.a with unprotected sex she doesn't know about."

(Tr., p.669, Ls.6-1I

(emphasis added).) As noted above, emotional appeals including those intended to
prejudice the jury against the defendant, are improper. State v. Porfer, 130 Idaho 772,
785,948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997).

Accordingly, all of the foregoing arguments were improper (whether offered to
engender sympathy for Ms. Schillereff or distaste for Mr. Troutman) and served to
deprive Mr. Troutman of his rights to due process and a fair trial.
The Prosecutor Engaqed In Misconduct By Attacking Mr. Troutman's
Credibility Based Her Own "Testimony"

4.

As was mentioned above, when Mr. Troutman admitted to the police that he had
had consensual sex with Ms. Schillereff, he apparently also explained to one of the
officers that "when they travel on a football team like they do, that almost on every road
trip they run into a female, maybe one, maybe more, who is there strictly to have sex
with multiple players of the football team, and he thought this was that situation." (Tr.,
p.456, L.21

-

p.457, L.2.) At least that was the direct examination testimony of

Detective Brechwald, one of the State's own witnesses.
During the prosecutor's closing argument, she sought to undermine this
statement that had been attributed to Mr. Troutman, apparently in an effort to cast
Mr. Troutman as a liar and Ms. Schillereff as a morally upright person. She argued as
follows: "Even women who-and
that-this

I am vet to hear from a single woman who has done

is anecdotal from him-that

there are women who have sex with multiple

members at one time, willingly have sex with multiple members at one time . . . ." (Tr,,
p.652, Ls. 1-9;)
While it was certainly permissible for the prosecutor to have argued that the jury
could have viewed the statement attributed to Mr. Troutman skeptically, it was not
permissible for her to make herself a witness by interjecting new evidence into the case
by claiming that she has never personally heard of a woman wanting to have sex with
multiple partners. See State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 525, 37 P.3d 18, 22 (Ct. App.

2001) ("We agree with Martinez that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to then refer
to evidence that was not admitted in an attempt to imply to the jury what that evidence
would have been."); State v. Corfez, 135 Idaho 561, 566, 21 P.3d 498, 503 (Ct. App.
2001) (finding misconduct where the prosecutor's "statements attempted to place before
the jury facts which went beyond the evidence presented at trial").

Based on this

misconduct, Mr. Troutman was denied due process and his right to a fair trial
5.

The Prosecutor Enqaged In Misconduct By Asking The Juw To Convict
Mr. Troutman Based On A Presumption Of Rape And/or In An Effort To
Change Existing "Lenient" Cultural Views Regarding Sex

Near the end of her closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the fact that
Mr. Troutman, after initially denying that he had taken anything from Ms. Schillereff's
room after having sex with Ms. Schillereff, later admitted that he had accidentally taken
some things thinking they were his.' (See Tr., p.654, L.12 - p.656, L.7.) She argued
that that, although Mr. Troutman had conceded some things about having taken some
of Ms. Schillereff's belongings, he still had not been totally forthcoming. (See Tr., p.655,
L.25

- p.656, L.6)

She then went back to talking about the alleged rape, stating as

follows:
He wants to finagle his way around the sexual issues. And I don't
know what it is about our culture, generally not American, but all malefemale relationships, where we give more importance to someone taking a
tangible thing from us without our permission, but we are more lenient
about the issue of someone having sexual penetration.
Maybe he could have been misled or misunderstood. We don't say
maybe he misunderstood that he could take a camera. He didn't ask her
about taking that, either.

'

Mr. Troutman told one of the officers as follows: "I was tipsy and I grabbed some stuff.
And I'm not going to say what it was. I grabbed some stuff thinking that it was my stuff
and found out that it wasn't. And so I gave it back as soon as I found out it wasn't
mine." (State's Ex. 22A, p.19, Ls.13-17.)

We are very clear on that issue, that you took the camera, didn't
ask the permission and that's not okay. But with the sex, we are willing to
sort of go into the realm of unreasonable, unfortunately.
(Tr., p.656, Ls.8-24.)
Although the foregoing argument is far from a model of clarity, it could have been
taken one (or both) of two ways by the jurors: (1) just as the jury can presume theft from
the fact that Mr. Troutman took Ms. Schillereff's camera without explicit permission, it
can presume rape from the fact that Mr. Troutman had sex with Ms. Schillereff without
specific permission; and/or (2) the jurors ought to apply a more pro-prosecution
standard to their deliberations because cultural views on non-consensual sex have
traditionally been too lax.

Either way (or both ways), the argument constitutes

misconduct.
a)

The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct Bv Askincl The Jurv To
Presume Raoe Based Upon The Mere Fact That Ms. Schillereff Did
Not Give Explicit Oral Consent To Have Sex With Mr. Troutman

There are a host of problems with the prosecutor's contention that, just as it is
clear that Mr. Troutman committed a theft by taking Ms. Schillereff's camera without her
explicit permission, so too did he commit a rape because he had sex with her without
her explicit permission. First, this argument misled the jury because it implied that
Mr. Troutman had been found guilty of theft when, in actuality, he had never even been
charged with, much less found to be guilty, of such an offense.

(See R., pp.11-13

(Indictment).) Second, it erroneously implied that the accidental taking of someone
else's property constitutes theft under Idaho law.

See I.C. § 18-2403 (generally

requiring an intent to deprive the owner of the property in question in order to constitute
theft). Third, it once again distorted and disparaged the defense as being one of "she

didn't say 'no,' so it's not rape." (See Part I(C)(2), supra.) Finally, it effectively sought to
lower the State's burden of proof by erroneously implying that, without explicit oral
permission for sex, the sex was necessarily non-consensual. See, e.g., State v. Lewis,
96 ldaho 743, 750, 536 P.2d 738, 745 (1975) (recognizing that the question of consent
is one for the jury, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances).
By misstating the facts, distorting and disparaging Mr. Troutman's defense, and
misstating the law, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Sfafe v. Beebe, 145 ldaho
570, 576, 181 P.3d 496, 502 (Ct. App. 2007) (prosecutor may not distort the defendant's
defense); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 ldaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993)
(prosecutor may not misstate the law so as to reduce its burden of proof)); see also Part
I(C)(l)(a), supra (arguing that a prosecutor, besides being prohibited from misstating
the evidence actually offered, has a duty avoid misstating facts not in evidence).
Accordingly, Mr. Troutman was denied due process and a fair trial.
b)

The Prosecutor Ennaaed In Misconduct By Askina The Jurv To
Render A Guilty Verdict In An Effort To Make A Statement Aaainst
Cultural Norms That Are Too Lax On The Subject Of NonConsensual Sex

It was also improper for the prosecutor to have argued that societal norms are
too lax when it comes to "the issue of someone having sexual penetration." (Tr., p.656,
Ls.8-24.)

The implication of this argument, of course, was that, by convicting Mr.

Troutman of rape in this case, the jury could do its part in shifting sexual mores back to
where they ought to be. As noted above, however, a prosecutor may not urge a jury to
convict a defendant in order to remedy what are perceived as larger societal problems.
United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly,
Mr. Troutman was denied due process and a fair trial.

D.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Complained Of In This Case Constitutes
Fundamental Error
Mr. Troutman concedes that none of the instances of misconduct complained of

above were objected to by his attorney at trial. However, instances of prosecutorial
misconduct may be considered fundamental errors which can be raised for the first time
on appeal. In State v. Spencer, 74 ldaho 173, 183, 258 P.2d 1147, 1154 (1953), for
example, the ldaho Supreme Court held as follows: "While we have generally held that
where there is no objection made at the time to the statements by an attorney in his
argument to the jury, the court will not consider alleged error in this respect. . . this is
not necessarily true as to arguments of prosecuting attorneys in criminal cases." More
recently, in State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007), the Court of
Appeals noted similarly:
Although we do not apply the fundamental error doctrine here, it should be
recognized that if prosecutorial misconduct is sufficiently egregious and
prejudicial, the trial court's failure to intervene sua sponfe may be found on
appeal to be fundamental error requiring reversal of a conviction. The trial
courts of this state possess authority and are encouraged to monitor the
course of closing arguments, to sua sponte intervene as warranted, and to
impose remedies or sanctions as appropriate to protect an accused's right
to a fair trial.

Id. at 88 n.2, 156 P.3d at 589 13.2 (emphasis added).
The ldaho Supreme Court has held that prosecutorial misconduct constitutes
fundamental error if it is "calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or
prejudice against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced
to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence." State v. Babb, 125 ldaho 934, 942,
877 P.2d 905, 913 (1994) (quoted in State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d
956, 969 (2003)).

With regard to opening statements and closing arguments

specifically, prosecutorial misconduct constitutes fundamental error only if the

comments were so egregious and/or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could
not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the
comments should be disregarded. State v. Corfez, 135 ldaho 561, 565, 21 P.3d 498,
502 (Ct. App. 2001) (closing arguments); State

v. Dunn 134 ldaho 165, 171, 997 P.2d

626, 632 (Ct. App. 1000) (both opening statements and closing arguments).
Mr. Troutman submits that the instances of misconduct described in Part I(C),
above, whether considered individually, or in the aggregate, constitute fundamental
error because so much of it was calculated inflame the passions and prejudices of the
jury and influence the verdict with matters outside the evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Troutman respectfully requests that the judgment
of conviction in this case be vacated, and that his case be remanded for a new trial.
DATED this

loih day of November, 2008.
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